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Abstract. Electric power grid components, such as high voltage
transformers (HVTs), generating stations, substations, etc. are ex-
pensive to maintain and, in the event of failure, replace. Thus,
regularly monitoring the behavior of such components is of utmost
importance. Furthermore, the recent increase in the number of cy-
berattacks on such systems demands that such monitoring strate-
gies should be robust. In this paper, we draw inspiration from work
in Moving Target Defense (MTD) and consider a dynamic mon-
itoring strategy that makes it difficult for an attacker to prevent
unique identification of behavioral signals that indicate the status
of HVTs. We first formulate the problem of finding a differentially
immune configuration set for an MTD in the context of power grids
and then propose algorithms to compute it. To find the optimal
movement strategy, we model the MTD as a two-player game and
consider the Stackelberg strategy. With the help of IEEE test cases,
we show the efficacy and scalability of our proposed approaches.1
1 Introduction
The electric power grid forms the backbone of all the other critical in-
frastructures (communication, transportation, water distribution, etc) of a
country, and thus, necessitates the presence of adequate monitoring strate-
gies to quickly detect any anomalous behavior(s) that may have manifested
in the system. It is of utmost importance to not only detect such anomalous
behavior but also to take appropriate actions quickly to prevent the failures
of power grid components which in turn, may lead to a large scale blackout
[1]. Components such as High Voltage Transformers (HVTs), generating
stations, substations, etc. are essential to the power grid and thus, their
operational behaviors are monitored at all times with the help of Phasor
Measurement Units (PMUs are devices, which are utilized as sensors, for
monitoring the power grid). The problem of placing these sensors has been
studied by multiple researchers over the past decade [21,18]. Recently, in
[4,17], the authors proposed a sensor placement approach that can uniquely
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identify the source of the anomaly by utilizing the sensor readings gener-
ated by PMUs. With the continuous discovery of real-world attacks such as
Stuxnet [13], Dragonfly [28] and a wide range of cyberattacks– jamming,
Denial of Service, packet dropping, false-data injection and compromise of
data integrity [15,16]– robustness of existing sensor placement mechanisms
becomes critical. Thus, in this work, we leverage the ideas of Moving Target
Defense (MTD) in cybersecurity [12,25] and the Minimum Discriminating
Code Set (MDCS) based PMU placement [3,4] to build a defense-in-depth
solution.
We continuously move the detection surface to make it challenging for
an adversary to impede the unique identification of failure signals of HVTs.
While PMUs are difficult to move, as opposed to the movement of phys-
ical resources in security games [19], once placed, they can be efficiently
activated and deactivated, similar to the dynamic movement in intrusion
detection systems [23]. While one may choose to activate all the PMUs
placed upfront, the cost of maintaining them can become an impediment.
Hence, the periodic use of a smaller subset (that still ensures unique iden-
tification) of the sensors placed upfront can be considered. Further, work
in MTD has relied solely on heuristic guidance when constructing the con-
figuration set that can result in all defenses being vulnerable to one attack,
i.e. it is not differentially immune [22]. In this paper, we propose methods
that ensure the MTD configuration set is differentially immune.
First, we define a novel variant of the MDCS problem, called the
K−differentially Immune MDCS (hereafter K-δMDCS). We find K MD-
CSs of a graph, in which all K solutions can uniquely identify failing HVTs,
with the added constraint that no two MDCSs share a common vertex; thus
resulting in a differentially immune configuration set for the MTD. Given
that the original MDCS problem is NP-Complete, we show that K-δMDCS
is also NP-Complete and provide an optimal Quadratically Constrained
Integer Linear Programming (QC-ILP) approach to find the Kmax-MDCS
of a graph. While our approach proves scalable for large power networks
(MATPOWER IEEE test cases), we also propose a greedy approach that is
computationally faster but trades-off on finding the largestK value. Second,
we model the interaction between the power utility company (hereafter, the
defender) and the adversary, as a normal-form game. The notion of Strong
Stackelberg equilibrium used in this game-theoretic formulation, popular
in existing literature [26,25], assumes a strong-threat model and aids in
finding a good sensor activation strategy for the defender. Finally, we show
the efficacy of our strategy and the scalability of our proposed approach on
several IEEE power test cases of varying sizes.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we first describe an electric power grid scenario and highlight
how it can be modeled as a graph. Then, we describe the MDCS problem,
showcasing how solutions to it can help with sensor placement, for the
unique monitoring of HVTs. Finally, we provide a quick overview of Moving
Target Defense (MTD) and the notion of differential immunity.
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Fig. 1. IEEE 14 Bus Single Line Diagram
2.1 The Electric Power Grid as a Graph
In Figure 1, we show the IEEE 14 Bus single line diagram of an electrical
power grid. In [4], the authors proposed a set of graph construction rules
that model the monitoring of HVTs as a bipartite graph G = (T ∪ S,E),
where T represents the set of High Voltage Transformers (HVTs) that need
to be uniquely monitored and S represents the locations where the PMUs
(or sensors) can be potentially placed (PMU’s cannot be directly placed
on HVTs), and E represents the set of edges that exist if the operational
behavior signal of an HVT (t ∈ T ) reaches a PMU (s ∈ S) within a pre-
specified number of hops. As Signal-to-Noise ratio (SNR) is used to measure
the operational signal of an HVT in the real-world, and are known to quickly
deteriorate over multiple hops, we, similar to prior works [4,17], consider
the number of hops to be at most 2 (see Figure 2).
2.2 Minimum Discriminating Code Set (MDCS)
The MDCS problem is a special case of the Minimum Identifying Code Set
(MICS) [14], and was first studied in [6]. Given a graph, the goal of MICS
is to identify the smallest set of nodes on which sensors can be placed such
that two properties are met (given domain-specific information propagation
constraints). First, if an event occurs at an entity represented by a node in
the graph, a unique set of sensors is activated leading to easy identification
of the node (entity). Second, every node should trigger a non-empty set of
sensors if an event occurs at the node. In MDCS, the problem is adapted
to a bipartite graph scenario with two (disjoint) sets of nodes– (i) nodes of
interest, where an event may occur, which have to be uniquely identified
with the sensors, and (ii) nodes on which sensors can be placed. Formally,
we can define the MDCS problem in the context of sensor placement in
power grid systems as follows [4].
Definition 1. Given a Bipartite Graph, G = (T∪S,E), a vertex set S′ ⊆ S
is defined to be the Discriminating Code Set of G, if ∀t ∈ T,N(t) ∩ S′ is
unique, where N(t) denotes the neighborhood of t. The Minimum Discrim-
inating Code Set (MDCS) problem is to find the Discriminating Code Set
of minimum size.
4 S. Sengupta et al.
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5V1/T =
V2/S =
Fig. 2. Bipartite Graph derived from the IEEE 14-bus network with 2-hop signal
propagation constraints.
Figure 2 represents the bipartite graph obtained from Figure 1, with 5
nodes in T , representing the 5 HVTs, and 40 nodes in S. An MDCS solution
S′ ⊆ S of this graph consists of three nodes (indicated by the three colored
nodes) which ensure that they provide a unique code to identify each of the
5 nodes in T (colors above the nodes of T indicate the unique combination
of sensors activated).
2.3 Moving Target Defense (MTD) and Differential Immunity
Conceptually, MTD, popular in cyber-security, seeks to continuously move
between a set of system configurations available to a defender, to take away
the attacker’s advantage of reconnaissance [12]. The key idea is that the at-
tacker may not encounter the expected system configuration at the time of
the attack, thereby being rendered ineffective. Formally, an MTD system
can be described using the three-tuple 〈C, T,M〉 where C represents the set
of system configurations a defender can move between, T represents a tim-
ing function that describes when the defender moves and M represents the
movement strategy [24]. The goal of this work is two-fold– (1) to construct
a desirable set C (for which we define the K-δMDCS problem in section 3)
and (2) an optimal movement strategy M (by modeling the interaction as
a game in section 4).
Note that when a single attack can cripple all the defense configurations
∈ C, MTD cannot aid in improving the robustness. In [22], the authors
introduce the notion of differential immunity that aims at measuring the
amount of diversity between configurations ∈ C. In this work, we consider
a C that is differentially immune (denoted as δ), i.e. each attack, allowed by
the threat model defined later, can only cripple one defense configuration.
This ensures maximum diversity of C and implies the highest robustness
gains for the formulated MTD.
3 K Differentially Immune MDCS (K-δMDCS)
To design the configuration set C for an MTD system, we first need to find
multiple MDCS sets of a bipartite graph. For this purpose, we desire K
differentially immune MDCS (K-δMDCS) where no two MDCS solutions
share a common sensor placement point. Formally,
Definition 2. (K-δMDCS) Given a Bipartite Graph, G = (T ∪S,E), K
vertex sets Si ⊆ S, i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} are defined to be K-δMDCS of G, if the
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t1 t2 t3 t4 t5V1/T =
V2/S =
Fig. 3. The IEEE 14-bus power grid graph has 4− δMCDS solutions.
following conditions hold– (1) all the sets Si are MDCSs of graph G and
(2) for all possible pairs of sets (Si, Sj), Si ∩ Sj = ∅.
First, we want to activate the minimum number of sensors placed in the
network at any point in time. Hence, we use K sets, all of which are MDCS,
i.e. have the smallest cardinality. Second, the use of differentially immune
MDCS tries to optimize for robustness in adversarial settings. If an attacker
were to attack a particular sensor placement point s ∈ S, it can hope to,
at best, cripple a singular MDCS Si ∈ C, from uniquely identifying HVT
failure. If the defender selects an MDCS Sj ∈ C(j 6= i), then the attacker
will not succeed in affecting the functionality of the power grid sensors.
We will now show that the decision problem corresponding to K-δMDCS
is NP-complete.
Lemma 1. K-δMDCS is NP-Complete, given K is an integer and K > 0.
Proof. We note that the original MDCS problem, which is known to be
NP-Complete [6], is a special case (when K = 1). uunionsq
Corollary 1. K-δ Graph Problems such as K-δMinimum Identifying Code
Set (MICS), K-δMinimum Set Cover (MSC), K-δMinimum Vertex Cover
(MVC) are NP-Complete when K is an integer and K > 0.2
Let us denote the size of an MDCS for a bipartite graph G as m. In
K-δMDCS, the goal of the defender is to find K MDCSs each of size m.
Then, the defender needs to place K ∗m sensors in the power grid and, at
any point in time, activate an MDCS set (of size m) to uniquely identify
failures in T . While a large number of defender strategies (i.e. larger values
of K) helps to increase their options for sensor activation in turn reducing
the success rate for the attacker, it also incurs the cost of placing K ∗m
sensors. Thus, the ideal choice of K should trade-off robustness vs. sensor
costs (when K = 1, robustness using MTD is impossible to achieve).
In cases where the defender has sufficient resources, one might ask what
is the maximum size of K? Depending on the structure of the underlying
graph, this question may have a trivial answer. For example, if the bipartite
graph has a t ∈ T and N(t) = {s}, s ∈ S, any MDCS of G needs to place
2 Note that in the context of these problems, the distinction between the node
sets T and S in MDCS are unnecessary and one can view the graphs as G =
(V,E).
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a sensor on s to uniquely detect a fault in t. Hence, there can exist no
two MDCSs that do not share a common node since s has to be a part of
both. In such cases, the max value of K, denoted as Kmax, is 1. Beyond
such cases, similar to the problem of finding the maximum value of K in
the K-clique problem, finding Kmax demands a search procedure over the
search space of K that we now describe.
3.1 Finding max K for K-δMDCS
We first propose a Quadratically Constrained Integer Linear Program
(QCILP) that given a value of K, finds K Discriminating Code Sets
(DCSs). We then showcase the algorithm for searching over possible val-
ues of k ∈ {1, . . . , |S|} to find the largest K. To define the QCILP for
G = (T ∪ S,E), we first consider |S| ∗ k binary variables where, xsk = 1
if a sensor is placed in node s ∈ S for the kth DCS, and 0 otherwise. We
also use a variable l that denotes the size of the DCSs found. We can now
describe our QCILP, presented below.
min
l,x
l (1)
s.t. l =
∑
s
xsk ∀k All k DCS has the same size l.∑
s∈S
(xsk − xsk′)2 = 2l ∀(k, k′) No two DCSs should have a common sensor.∑
s∈N(t)
xsk ≥ 1 ∀t,∀k All t ∈ T has a sensor monitoring them for all the k solutions.
∑
s∈N(t)∆N(t′)
xsk ≥ 1 ∀(t, t′),∀k t and t′ trigger unique sensors for the k-th DCS.
xsk ∈ 0, 1∀s,∀k
The last two constraints ensure that each of the K solutions is Discrim-
ination Code Sets where (1) all t ∈ T trigger at least one sensor s ∈ S and
(2) for all pairs of t and t′ (both ∈ T ), there exists at least one sensor in the
symmetric difference set of t and t′ that is a part of the DCS, which in turn
uniquely distinguishes between t and t′. The first two constraints ensure
that all k DCSs are of equal size and no two DCSs shares a common sensor.
We can now ask the question as to whether the DCSs found by Equation 1
is indeed the Minimum DCSs (MDCSs) for the graph G. In this regard, we
now show the following.
Theorem 1. For all values K ≤ Kmax, the optimization problem in Equa-
tion 1 returns K-δMDCS.
Proof. We consider proof by contradiction. Given the value of K(≤ Kmax),
let us assume that the solution returned by Equation 1 is not the K-δMDCS
for the graph G. If this is the case, at least one of the two properties in the
definition of K-δMDCS is violated. Thus, either (1) the returned solution
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Algorithm 1: Finding Kmax − δMDCS.
1: In: G = (T ∪ S,E)
2: Out: Kmax − δMDCS
3: solutions ← ∅
4: K ← 1
5: while K ≤ |S| do
6: solutionsK ← Solve Equation 1 with K
7: if solutionsK == ∅ then
8: break Infeasible for K > Kmax
9: end if
10: if solutions ! = ∅ and |solutions(l)| < |solutionsK(l)| then
11: break DCS returned is not MDCS for K > Kmax
12: end if
13: solutions ← solutionsK
14: K ← K + 1
15: end while
16: return solutions
consists of a DCS that is not the Minimum DCS, or (2) there exists a sub-
set (of size greater than one) among the set of DCSs that share a common
node.
Owing to the third and fourth constraints, all the solutions constitute
a DCS. Now, if (1) is violated, all the DCSs returned by the QCILP, of
length l, are not the MDCS for G. Thus, the MDCS must have a DCS of
size l′ ≤ l. Given that the minimization objective finds the smallest DCS
and K ≤ Kmax, this cannot be possible. Hence, (1) does not hold.
For (2), let us say that there exists a subset of the DCSs returned that
share a common node. If this was the case, then at least one solution pair
has to share a common node. If this node is denoted as s∗ and the two
solutions are termed as k and k′, then for the second constraint, given
xs∗k = xs∗k′ = 1, the term for s
∗ is zero. Even if the other l − 1 nodes in
the solutions k and k′ are unique, the terms will add up to 2∗(l−1) thereby
violating the second constraint. This is not possible and as a consequence,
(2) does not hold. uunionsq
Given this, we can now consider cases where K > Kmax. When K >
Kmax, the optimization problem in Equation 1 is either infeasible or returns
K DCSs that are not MDCS for graph G. This condition holds by the
definition of Kmax (proof by contradiction ensues if neither of the two cases
holds). With these conditions in mind we can design an iterative approach,
shown in algorithm 1, to find the Kmax − δMDCS of a given graph.
Figure 3 showcases the 4−δMDCS solutions returned by algorithm 1 for
the 14-bus power grid network. The different colors indicate the different
MDCSs found for G and the shades of the same color indicate an MDCS set.
As shown, each of the four MDCS has a size of l = 3 and uniquely identifies
all the transformers T . The lack of overlapping colors in the bottom set of
nodes indicates that no two MDCS share a common s ∈ S.
While the procedure in algorithm 1 finds the Kmax− δMDCS, it can be
time-consuming for the largest networks (although it works well on large
power-grids as shown in the experimental section). Thus, one can consider a
greedy approach in which one solves the MDCS problem using [4]. We then
solve this ILP with the additional constraints that xs = 0 for all the sensors
found in the current solution and keep doing so until (1) the ILP becomes
infeasible or (2) results in DCS that does not have minimum cardinality. In
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↓ AD | AA → . . .
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(
t1
t4
)
,
(
t2
t5
)
, t3)− CA(•)
+
∑
t∈T U
D(t),
−CA(•)
+
∑
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D(t),
−CA(•)
UD(t3),
UD(
(
t1
t2
)
,
(
t4
t5
)
)− CA(•)
. . .
. . . . . .
. . .
Fig. 4. Game-matrix for the dynamic sensor activation problem.
the experimental section, we will see that although this approach is faster,
it can output K-δMDCS where K < Kmax. The sub-optimality is a result
of the ordering “enforced” by the current optimal MDCSs which in turn,
proves to be infeasible constraints for the latter iterations of the problem.
4 Game Theoretic Formulation
The defender’s goal is to maintain the unique identifying capability of HVTs
at all times. Conversely, the attacker tries to prevent this capability, thereby
making it harder for the defender to effectively monitor the HVTs. Here,
we seek to find the optimal movement function M for the sensor activation
MTD to aid the defender to realize its objective. To do so, we consider
a strong threat-model where the attacker A with recon, is aware of the
defender D’s (probabilistic) sensor activation strategy, thereby making the
Stackelberg Equilibrium an appropriate solution concept for our setting. We
use a polynomial-time approach to find the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium
of the game [8]. We now briefly describe the various parameters of the
formulated game (see Figure 4).
Defense Actions The defender has Kmax pure strategies and the configura-
tion set C = Kmax − δMDCS. If one uses the greedy algorithm instead of
the optimal approach (both described in the previous section), the number
of pure strategies obtained may be less than Kmax.
Attack Actions We assume that an attacker can spend reconnaissance effort
in figuring out the sensor placement point. Thus, its action set includes
attacking a sensor that may be considered for activation (instead of all
nodes in |S|). While one can consider attackers with the capability to attack
multiple sensor activation points, it is often too expensive a cost model as
it demands resource procurement and distribution over a wide geographic
area.
Player Utilities The game has two different kinds of utilities that are used to
calculate the rewards. First, the defender receives the utility associated with
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Table 1. Game parameters and defender’s reward for playing the different Cs
and Ms for the various power-grid networks.
C Movement Function M
Graph |S|+ |T | |AD|
(K/Kmax)
|AA|
(K/Kmax)
URS
(K)
URS
(Kmax)
SSE
(K)
SSE
(Kmax)
14 Bus 45 4/4 12/12 18.5±4.7 18.65±4.7 20.62±4.6 20.72±4.6
30 Bus 89 4/4 16/16 26.45±5.7 27.25±5.6 29.44±6 29.9±5.8
39 Bus 96 7/9 28/36 18.7±5 19.24±5.2 19.8±5.3 19.73±5.3
57 Bus 170 6/6 60/60 70.76±10.8 70.88±11.1 73.5±10.6 73.07±10.7
89 Bus 422 16/21 96/126 50.67±8.9 51±9 52.2±9.2 52.2±9.2
118 Bus 367 2/2 10/10 31.35 ±6 31.6 ± 6 32.45±6.4 32.61±6.1
2383 Bus 5927 2/3 212/318 832.7±38.7 836.16±36.7 835.34±39 842.34±39.4
uniquely identifying a transformer t ∈ T in the case of anomalous spikes
indicative of failure (to occur). We assume that a transformer supplying
power to an important building (eg. the White House or the Pentagon) is
considered to be more important than one supplying power to a residential
area. Second, the attacker’s cost for attacking a particular sensor needs to
be considered. While some sensors may be placed in high-security areas,
others may be easier to access. We conduct randomized trials with both
these values ∈ [0, 10], with 10 indicating the HVT/sensor most important
to protect/difficult to attack.
In the bottom right corner of Figure 4, the defender, owing to the at-
tacker attacking a sensor, is only able to uniquely identify t3 and thus, only
gets reward proportional to it. Contrarily, the attacker, due to attacking a
sensor, can make failures of t1 and t2 (and t4 and t5) indistinguishable and
receives the corresponding utilities, minus the cost of attacking the sensor
denoted by the light blue node (∈ S, Figure 3). Similarly, if the attacker
selects the attack represented by the first attack column (sensor denoted
by the dark brown node), the defender cannot identify any HVT and thus,
gets a utility of zero.
5 Experimental Simulation
In this section, we conduct simulation studies on seven IEEE test graphs
popular in the power domain [29]. Characteristics of these graphs such as
the total number of nodes (i.e. |S| + |T |) are shown in Table 1. The table
further lists the K values for the K-δMDCS found by the greedy and the
optimal algorithm 1, and is denoted by K and Kmax respectively. The
number of attacker strategies is listed in the fourth column. This value can
be obtained by multiplying the corresponding K value with the size of an
MDCS for graph G, since none of the K-δMDCS share a common node.
We now discuss two results– (1) the effectiveness of the game-theoretic
equilibrium compared to the Uniform Random Strategy baseline (which
chooses to activate a particular MDCS with equal probability) and (2) the
time is taken by the greedy and the optimal algorithm and their respective
solution quality. 3
3 The code for the experiments can be found at https://github.com/
kaustav-basu/Robust-MICS
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Fig. 5. Time taken by the optimal (algorithm 1) vs. the greedy approach for
finding Kmax − δMDCS and K-δMDCS (the K values are shown above the plot
points).
Effectiveness of Game-Theoretic Equilibrium In Table 1, we show
that in all test cases, the optimal movement strategy at the Strong Stack-
elberg Equilibrium (SSE) gives the defender a higher reward than choosing
URS. When using URS or SSE, in most cases we see higher gains when the
construction of the MTD configuration set C is optimal (URS(Kmax) ob-
tained from algorithm 1) as opposed to using a greedy algorithm (URS(K)).
We expected this as the higher number of differentially immune options (as
Kmax > K) chosen with equal probability reduces the probability of pick-
ing the weakest strategy. When the value of Kmax = K, such as for 14,
30, 57 and 118 buses, we see that the difference between the two versions
of URS (or two versions of SSE) are negligible. A reason for the non-zero
difference between the rewards values arises because of the MDCS sets cho-
sen, although the total number of sets chosen are the same. We also see
that the difference in defender rewards can be large even when the differ-
ence between K and Kmax is small in the case of larger networks (eg. 2383
bus). Thus, without finding the Kmax and the SSE for the optimal C, it is
hard to establish the loss in rewards. Given that these strategies are pre-
computed, the power grid utility operator should not consider the greedy
strategy unless the time required becomes prohibitive.
Computational Time for finding C In Figure 5, we compare the time
taken for finding the configuration set C using the optimal vs. the greedy
approach. We choose the logarithmic scale for the y-axis because the com-
putational time of the optimal and greedy approaches for the 14, 30, 39,
57, and 118 buses was less than a second, and thus difficult to distinguish
between on a linear scale. The largest disparity occurs when the size of
the optimal set Kmax is greater than the K-sized set found by the greedy
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approach (39/89/2383 Bus). In other cases, while the optimal approach is
slower, it provides the guarantee that no solution with a greater K exists,
which is absent in the greedy case. A case where the logarithmic scale,
from a visualization perspective, does not do justice is the 2383-Bus. The
time taken by the greedy approach is 15s compared to 291s taken by the
optimal approach. While the K value differs by a factor of one, the resul-
tant gain in defender’s game value, as shown in Table 1, is relatively large.
Thus, the added time in generating the optimal configuration set needs to
be criticized based on the gain obtained in the underlying game.
We also consider the pragmatic scenario when the K value is fixed by the
defender up-front owing to budget restrictions of sensors that can be placed
in the power network. In this case, the greedy approach has to iteratively
find one solution at a time, adding them to the constraint set of future
iterations until the desired k is reached. On the other hand, the iterative
procedure in algorithm 1 can be altogether ignored and one can simply
return the solution found by the optimization problem in Equation 1.
6 Related Works
Adversarial attacks on power grids comprise of false-data injection, jam-
ming, DoS and packet-dropping attacks [9,10,15]. While researchers have
proposed a multitude of defense mechanisms [27], including Moving Tar-
get Defense (MTDs) [7,20], they do not consider the problem of sensor
placement to monitor HVTs. On the other hand, works that leverage the
formalism of Discriminating Code Sets [6] to optimize sensor placement [4],
have focused on scalability issues and provided theoretical bounds in these
settings [3]; completely ignore the issue of robustness to adversarial intent.
In this work, we attempted to fill in this gap.
While an array of research work has formally investigated the notion
of finding an optimal movement function M for MTDs, the configuration
set C is pre-decided based on heuristic guidance from security experts [24].
While some works consider the aspect of differential immunity by analyzing
code overlap for cyber systems [5] or Jacobians of gradients for deep neural
networks [2], these measures have no way of ensuring differential immunity.
The notion of k-set diverse solutions in Constraint Satisfaction Program-
ming (CSP) [11], although conceptually similar to our notion of differential
immunity, does not have the added constraint of finding a minimum sized
solution (as in the case of MDCS). In adversarial scenarios, our work is
the first to formalize the notion of diversity in graphs and propose linear
programming methods to find them.
7 Conclusion
We considered the problem of monitoring the behavior of HVTs in adver-
sarial settings and proposed an approach based on MTD, formulating it
as a game between the power utility company (the defender) and an ad-
versary. We showed that finding the configuration set for the defender is
NP-Complete and presented two algorithms– an optimal QC-ILP and a
12 S. Sengupta et al.
greedy iterative-ILP. Optimal movement strategies at Stackelberg Equilib-
rium enabled the defender to activate k sensors at a time and uniquely
identify failure points in the face of adversarial attacks. Results obtained
on several IEEE test cases showed that the proposed methods yields the
highest expected reward for the defender.
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